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Abstract: This article discusses alleged availability to the FBI of actionable intelligence prior to 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
 
Often ignored in the controversy over whether the United States' (US) Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) optimally or even passably collected, analyzed, produced, transmitted, and/or responded to 
intelligence bearing on the impending 9/11 terrorist attacks is the meaning of "information to prevent 
terrorist attacks." The highest level FBI authorities have been claiming such information was not 
available. [But see the Note below.] Some other FBI personnel and also other US Government leaders 
are suggesting that such information was or might have been available. Are these two sides contesting 
with similarly understood language, or are they arguing past each other? 
 
The most conservative example of availability might constitute a pre-9/11 conversation intercepted via 
technology of the plot's participants describing all the operational details of the attacks. Or a written 
document obtained before 9/11 and provided by a highly credible source again laying out all aspects of 
the operational planning. Such examples are relatively infrequent in the history of aviation terrorism 
and--if more frequent--would obviate the need for an intelligence analysis capability. 
 
Less conservative examples of availability might constitute the identification of motivations, trends, 
patterns, and operational likelihoods based on a variety of information--some of this information being 
extremely disparate, irrelevant, and orthogonal to the unsophisticated eye. Such attempts at this 
identification are the mode for the history of aviation terrorism and often, unfortunately, have not been 
completed before a terrorist operation occurs. This conclusion bears out the need for better intelligence 
analysis, better collection obviating the need for better analysis, or, perhaps, the approximately 
Sisyphean nature of analysis. 
 
For the highest level FBI authorities to claim that "information to prevent terrorist attacks" was not 
available may be correct according to the above's first set of examples. According to the second set of 
examples, the claim may be correct, yet unknowable in accuracy, or incorrect--the latter even suggesting 
sheer incompetence on the part of these authorities. Yet, the most likely version of "incorrect" may 
involve the continuous noise of multiple threats; huge volumes of information that are themselves 
incomplete, ambiguous, or misleading; bureaucratic, cultural dysfunctions and political dynamics 
including the phenomenon of circling the wagons; and the bottom-line observation that the prediction 
of violence by a specific perpetrator for a specific time, place, target, and method is extremely difficult. 
 
As with much in the way of Washington scandal and scandal in general, blame may be most due towards 
crisis management after the perceived shortfall about matters before the shortfall. Unfortunately, little 
of this might be germane for girding against the next terrorist onslaught. 
 
Note. This article was written hours before the FBI Director publicly announced, "I cannot say for sure 
that there wasn't a possibility we could have come across some lead that would have led us to the 
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hijackers." The double negative construction may suggest ambivalence even now in changing a public 
posture and private belief. (See Grossman, P.Z. (1994). The dilemma of prisoners: Choice during Stalin's 
great terror, 1936-38. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38, 43-55; Johnston, D. (May 3 0, 2002). Self-
criticism and risk: many interests to please. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Lewis, N.A., 
& Johnston, D. (May 29, 2002). F.B.I. Director, facing criticism, plans new focus on terror flight. The New 
York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Simmons, C. H., & Mitch, J. R. (1985). Labeling public aggression: 
When is it terrorism? Journal of Social Psychology, 125, 245-251; Sternberg, R.J. (2002). Why smart 
people can be so stupid. Yale University Press.) (Keywords: FBI, Intelligence Gathering, Terrorism.) 
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